Debian Weak Keys

In 2008 a Debian patch (CVE-2008-0166) stripped OpenSSL's PRNG down to the process PID — only ~15 bits (0–32767) of entropy, so every generated key came from a tiny, brute-forcible seed space. This tool models that collapse: a small PID seed is turned into a secp256k1 key (seed → SHA-256 → private key). Verify a PID to see its key and addresses, or scan a PID range to recover the private key behind a target address on the selected chain. Every hit is verified by regenerating the address. Everything runs in your browser.

bitcoin
Brute-forces the PID seed range below (both 32-/64-bit variants) and recovers the private key if the address was generated under the modeled entropy collapse.
to the classic Debian PID space is 0–32767 (~32k keys, seconds to scan)
derives the key + addresses for one seed (instant)
Scope: this models the class of failure — entropy collapsed to a ~15-bit seed — not a byte-exact reproduction of a specific 2008 OpenSSL build, so it will not recover keys from real historical Debian wallets. It recovers any key generated under this model and demonstrates why a collapsed PRNG is catastrophic. 
Instructions:
1. Verify a PID — type a PID seed (e.g. 1337) and press "Verify PID" to derive its secp256k1 key, WIF, and both P2PKH addresses instantly.
2. Scan a range — paste a Bitcoin P2PKH address (starts with 1…), set a PID range (default 0–32767, the classic Debian space), and press "Scan range". The private key is recovered if the address was generated under the modeled entropy collapse.
3. A key is shown only when it regenerates the target address, so a match is verified, not guessed. Both 32- and 64-bit seed variants are tried.
4. No internet needed — all secp256k1 and hashing runs in your browser.
Educational tool — models a vulnerability class. This reproduces the effect of the 2008 Debian OpenSSL entropy collapse (CVE-2008-0166): a private key determined by a small ~15-bit PID seed, exhaustively brute-forcible. It is not a byte-exact reproduction of a specific vulnerable OpenSSL build, so it will not recover keys from real historical Debian wallets — it recovers any key generated under this model and shows why a collapsed PRNG is catastrophic. Every recovered key is verified by regenerating the address; nothing is guessed. Never enter keys for wallets you use.